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The unification of the two Yemeni states–the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and 
the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), respectively–in 1990 has 
been a resounding failure. Merging the tribal-dominated northern and state-party 
dominated southern regimes meant increasing the number of factions competing for 
access to state resources to satisfy material and security needs of their respective 
networks of influence. In particular, efforts at growing the resource base of the unified 
state after 1990, by means of an expansion of oil and gas exploration and extraction, 
raised the revenue base of the state in an unsustainable manner. Such growth in national 
oil and gas rents increased rather than decreased competition over state authority to 
control the spoils. 
The major subsequent events, such as the 1994 civil war, the 2004-2010 “Saada wars” 
against the Houthi movement, the Yemeni version of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, the 
failure of the National Dialogue Conference (March 2013-January 2014), and the start of 
the Saudi and Emirati bombing campaign and subsequent ground war in Yemen since 
March 2015 all triggered major clashes between different factions of the Yemeni state 
bureaucracy, army, and civil society. On each of these occasions, efforts to freeze out 
some Yemeni actors produced escalating conflict between the remaining factions instead 
of a winning coalition that could have reestablished a degree of stability. The article 
explains how local, regional, and global factors have jointly overwhelmed the Yemeni 
actors, and how foreign intervention has led to the further deterioration of the 
pre-existing national crisis. 
INTRODUCTION 
The state of Yemen, formed in 1990 after the unification 
of North and South Yemen, the northern Yemen Arab Re-
public (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Repub-
lic of Yemen (PDRY), respectively, does not feature promi-
nently in the literature of development studies. For 
example, an influential monograph titled Why Nations Fail: 
The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty does not make 
any reference to the country (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 
Crucially, Yemen’s case of fragile statehood, which has dra-
matically deteriorated since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE) military interven-
tion and bombing campaign targeting the country since 
2015, now represents the most severe humanitarian crisis in 
the world (International Rescue Committee, 2020, pp. 7-8). 
This paper scrutinizes the comparatively underexplored 
case of Yemen. It takes the form of a qualitative case study 
based on a longitudinal approach that examines the Re-
public of Yemen between 1990 and 2020. The absence of 
reliable statistical data and of meaningful quantitative re-
search methods suggests that qualitative research is in the 
Yemeni context the most suitable approach. 
Yemen’s unification was initially presented as a political 
project based on the principle of full equality between the 
north and the south. However, the population of the north 
is at least three times higher than the less densely popu-
lated but geographically more spacious south, and the po-
litical establishment of the north subsequently became 
prone to marginalize the south politically. This resulted in 
the large-scale collapse of southern representation in the 
unified state following a brief civil war between northern 
and southern forces in 1994. 
Since then, the country has suffered from many rounds 
of internal military, economic, and social upheaval, produc-
ing long-standing conflicts between an increasingly frag-
mented and brittle state facing various domestic oppo-
nents. Most prominently, the so-called “Houthi” 
insurgency that initially started off in 1997 as a local con-
flict over land rights in the northern border region of Saada 
challenged the state. Since 2004, Yemen’s military con-
ducted counterinsurgency against the Houthis. In 2011, the 
long-standing Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah Saleh (office-
holder in the YAR between 1978 and 1990 and in the unified 
country between 1990 and 2011), was toppled in a series of 
events related to the “Arab spring.”1 
However, the removal of Saleh and the announcement 
of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as new president of a “transi-
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tional government” produced further escalation of Yemeni 
conflicts. Hadi had previously served for twenty years as 
Saleh’s Vice-President. Many defectors from Saleh’s previ-
ous regime considered him as a suitable replacement ex-
actly because he did not stand for any fundamental restruc-
turing of Yemeni politics. Following pro-forma elections 
with him as the only candidate in February 2012, he re-
ceived endorsements from the United States (US), the 
United Nations (UN) system, and Saudi Arabia. A subse-
quent “National Dialogue Conference” between 2013 and 
2014 developed into a talking shop that produced 1800 rec-
ommendations but failed to offer any agreement on inclu-
sive government. Two major Yemeni opposition groups, the 
Houthis and the Southern Movement, the latter a politi-
cal alliance demanding autonomy or full separation of the 
south from the north, became increasingly excluded from 
the conference proceedings. This meant that Hadi came to 
rely on Saudi-backed Islamist groups and foreign aid rather 
than domestic support (Brehony, 2015) 
Hadi’s decision to exclude significant Yemeni political 
actors from power-sharing subsequently triggered the 
Houthi’s military takeover of the Yemeni capital of Sanaa 
in September 2014. This move was facilitated by the switch 
of loyalty of many state actors, notably Yemeni army and 
air force units still close to former President Saleh, to the 
Houthi camp. Saleh also started to work with the Houthis 
since his earlier loss of control of state resources meant that 
he had to find new allies to regain influence, which was only 
possible by forging ties with groups that he had previously 
fought against. 
Following the Houthi takeover of Sanaa, Hadi narrowly 
escaped to Saudi Arabia from where he subsequently en-
dorsed the Saudi military campaign on Yemen code-named 
“Operation Decisive Storm” (subsequently redubbed, 
equally inappropriately, “Operation Renewal of Hope”). On-
going ever since September 26, 2015, this campaign was 
supposed to return Hadi to office by defeating the Houthis 
and other opposition groups. However, Saudi bombing only 
resulted in the destruction of Yemen. Indeed, airstrikes and 
the subsequent ground war of Saudi and UAE backed forces 
in Yemen dramatically escalated the crisis, not least due to 
the fact that both sides backed competing Yemeni factions 
as proxies in their mutual competition to control Yemen. 
The subsequent article is organized as follows: The next 
section presents basic geographical and historical informa-
tion on Yemen. Afterwards, a “conflict matrix” is put for-
ward suggesting that local, regional, and global influences 
and different time frames must all be considered to gain a 
better understanding of root causes of Yemeni conflicts. Ap-
plying such conflict matrix, understood as a heuristic de-
vice, allows for a balanced analysis of the past trajectory 
and recent dramatic deterioration in Yemen’s development 
and statehood. In the subsequent section, a representative 
sample of the academic literature on Yemen is examined – 
in line with the conflict matrix – to trace main causes of the 
current conflict. Three subsections present local, regional, 
and global drivers of the shift toward Yemeni state collapse 
since 2015. 
The penultimate section then moves toward a descriptive 
account of the major political, economic, and military de-
velopments within Yemen in the period between 1990 and 
2020 in the light of the previous theoretical analysis. Fi-
nally, the conclusion sums up the argument and examines 
how Yemen’s case might be instructive in the context of 
larger debates about “collapsed,” “fragile,” “illusory,” “lim-
ited,” “failed,” or “broken” statehood–each of these terms 
having been applied in the context of debates on Yemen 
(Bonnefoy, 2017). 
YEMEN: GEOGRAPHY AND POLICAL HISTORY 
Regional and tribal cleavages have had the most per-
sistent influence on Yemeni society throughout history. By 
contrast, a unified state monopolizing the legitimate use of 
force in the sense suggested by sociologist Max Weber has 
been largely absent. Rather than to analyze “the state,” it is 
therefore more useful to focus on degrees of statehood dur-
ing different time periods. The territory of today’s Repub-
lic of Yemen consists of three major geographical compo-
nents, namely the most populous North Yemen, the harbor 
town of Aden (a British colony between 1839 and 1967), and 
the less populated Hadramaut area. The latter two regions 
jointly made up what became between 1967 and 1990 the 
state of South Yemen (PDRY). 
What is remarkable about North Yemen is that it 
emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 
as the only entity on the Arab peninsula free from sig-
nificant British influence (Macris, 2010). It was ruled be-
tween 1918 and 1962 by the “Imamate,” namely two rulers 
drawn from the “Zaydi” minor branch of Shia Islam (so-
called “Fiver” Shiites).2 In 1962, a republican revolution re-
moved the last Zaydi Imam resulting in the foundation of 
the YAR. This event was directly followed by a civil war 
in which Egypt supported the republican side while Saudi 
Arabia and the United Kingdom (UK) backed a failed effort 
to restore the Zaydi monarchy. After the end of the war 
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uses the most common transcriptions. However, different spellings might be used depending on the quoted source. Thus, the two 
spellings of the name “Saleh” and “Salih” both refer to the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
The Zaydis form a minor branch of Shia Islam and are unique to Yemen. They differ substantially from “Twelver” Shias in Iraq, Iran, and 
Lebanon. The former believe that Zaydi ibn Ali ibn Husayn should have been the rightful fifth Shia imam (hence the term “Fiver”), while 
the latter believe in the mystical disappearance of the twelfth imam. ‘"Twelvers’ have a conflicted relationship with Sunni Muslims be-
cause of the martyrdom of Imam Ali’s son, Husayn, the grandson of Muhammad, at Karbala, Iraq, in the year 680 C.E." (Day, 2012, p. 31). 
To put it differently, the Zaydis and Shafi’is of Yemen are closer in terms of religious doctrine than is the case in other traditions. Western 
journalism reporting the war in Yemen as part of a regional conflict between Sunnis and Shias is in this sense misleading. 
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Map 1. Topography of Yemen. 
Courtesy of Prof. Paporn Thebpanya, Department of Geography and Environmental Planning, Towson University. 
For the online version, click for enlargement. 
in 1970, the victorious republican regime in North Yemen 
managed to bring Zaydis and Shafi’is together. The YAR be-
came more consolidated during the presidency of Ibrahim 
al-Hamdi between 1974 and 1977. Al-Hamdi is still broadly 
credited as the first individual to master modern Yemeni 
mass politics in unifying various regional constituencies in 
the service of nation building. After his assassination in 
1977 and following a transition period, the long-standing 
Saleh Presidency started off in 1978. In order to perpetuate 
his rule, Saleh came to rely on ever-shifting alliances with 
domestic and external actors. He notably failed to gain per-
sonal credibility as an impartial actor along the lines of his 
predecessor al-Hamdi. 
It should be noted that political cleavages in North 
Yemen continue to strongly overlap with geographical fea-
tures. The northern province of Saada bordering Saudi Ara-
bia amounts to a “Zaydi heartland.” Slightly further south 
but north of the capital Sanaa, the Hashid and Bakil tribal 
confederations (also Zaydi) are settled. Many observers 
considered the long-term leader of the Hashid tribal con-
federation, Shaykh Abdullah Ibn Husayn al-Ahmar (died 
2007), as the most powerful single actor in Yemen. As the 
leader of the then most coherent tribal network, he was 
usually believed to be placed above Saleh in the informal 
political hierarchy of the country. 
Looking at Yemen’s different geographical regions, the 
northern and central highlands (up to 3600 meters altitude) 
are Zaydi-settled, while the southern midlands and coastal 
zones are mostly Shafi’i-settled. The Shafi’is, a minor sect 
within the Sunni Muslim tradition, form an overall majority 
of the northern population. They are mostly settled in the 
areas south of the capital Sanaa around the city of Taiz and 
in the coastal areas facing the Red Sea. The southern re-
gions of Yemen (the former PDRY) are in turn overwhelm-
ingly settled by Shafi’is. There also exists a third much 
smaller sect of Ishmaelites settled in the north. 
As already stated above, the academic literature on 
Yemen generally warns against using sect dichotomies to 
explain political and economic conflict. It should therefore 
be stressed that Zaydis and Shafi’is both form minorities 
within their respective religious traditions and have been 
moderate in terms of their limited doctrinal differences 
when compared to other Muslim countries. It has further 
been suggested that “Zaydi-Shafi’i politics were less a mat-
ter of religious sectarianism than they were a reflection of 
the age-old division between highland and midland/coastal 
regions of Yemen” (Day, 2012, p. 33). Finally, it is important 
to note that the Zaydi highlands have historically been as-
sociated with tribal authority and warrior traditions, while 
the Shafi’i mid- and lowlands have been associated with 
trade and commerce. 
Moving beyond these “traditional” regional and sect-
based divisions, the country’s “modern” politics also in-
cludes political party actors, namely the catch-all “General 
People’s Congress” (GPC) that used to be associated with 
former President Saleh as the party of power. Since the lat-
ter’s demise, the GPC has collapsed into different tenden-
cies. Some GPC elements have subsequently become asso-
ciated with the Houthis. Another influential party used to 
be the Saudi-sponsored “Yemeni Congregation for Reform” 
(or al-Islah Party), which was formed in 1990 as an explic-
itly Islamist party led by the then Hashid tribal leader Ab-
dullah al-Ahmar. Finally, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) 
represented the former southern regime that was, until its 
dissolution in 1990, nominally Marxist-Leninist in orienta-
tion. 
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The 1990 unification of the two Yemeni states partially 
came about because the southern regime had been shaken 
by a 1986 intra-party war in which one YSP faction (the 
one led by Ali Nasir Mohamed which included Hadi in a ju-
nior capacity) was militarily defeated by another YSP group 
(the conflict was mostly driven by tribal rather than ideo-
logical factors). Survivors of the defeated southern YSP Ali 
Nasir faction, including Hadi, fled to the north and subse-
quently formed an interest group lobbying for unification of 
the two Yemeni states. More importantly, however, it had 
become known since the second half of the 1980s that sig-
nificant energy resources (oil and gas) are located in the 
Marib and Shabwah provinces located along the then intra-
Yemeni border (Reliefweb, 2010). Unifying the two states 
appeared as a necessary political precondition to effectively 
exploit the natural resources. 
Apart from its resource base, Yemen is also of high 
geostrategic and geoeconomic significance. Strategically, 
Yemen’s south-western coastal shores oversee Bab el-Man-
deb (“Gate of Tears”), a 27-kilometer wide sea route con-
necting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian 
Ocean. This shipping route is one of ten “choke points” of 
international trade, namely the Gate represents the major 
trade route between the Mediterranean Sea (via the Suez 
Canal) and Asia. The opposite shore of the Yemeni choke 
point belongs to the state of Djibouti, a former French 
colony which still hosts a French military base (the largest 
outside of mainland France). In addition, Djibouti houses 
permanent US, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese military 
bases, as well as a temporary German, Spanish, and Turkish 
military presence. This heavy military buildup is usually de-
scribed as motivated by the struggle against piracy in waters 
off the shores of Djibouti’s southern neighboring state of 
Somalia, which has been devastated by decades of civil war. 
However, it also underscores the significant strategic value 
of controlling Yemeni coastal areas. 
Moreover, the detached Yemeni island of Socotra located 
off the southern coast of Yemen in the approach to the Gulf 
of Aden is also of considerable geostrategic value. In recent 
times, the island has experienced incursions of Saudi, US, 
and Emirati military forces. Saudi and UAE military units 
are currently stationed on the island located in the cen-
ter of significant oil routes. Major Chinese regional invest-
ments such as the Chinese-funded Pakistani harbor pro-
ject of Gwadar, the Chinese oil exploration in Somaliland, 
and the Chinese infrastructure and harbor projects in Er-
itrea and Ethiopia are also located in the vicinity of Socotra. 
Thus, future contest over control of the island could develop 
into another conflict spot with regional and global reper-
cussions. 
Turning to geoeconomics, there exists a longstanding 
debate about Yemen’s potential as an oil and gas producer. 
The existing oil and gas fields are located in the regions of 
Al Jawf, Marib, Shabwan, and Hadramout (the former two 
located in the former north and the latter two in the former 
south). It needs to be stressed that US, Soviet (in the late 
1980s), Canadian, and Chinese oil companies have all con-
ducted some surveys, although information about the mag-
nitude of discovered oil and gas fields is not publicly avail-
able and all drilling activities have stopped since 2015 due 
to the war. Yemen’s overall significance for global oil and 
gas supplies has so far been modest and some existing fields 
are now already close to exhaustion. However, a geological 
survey suggested that “[t]welve onshore and offshore sed-
imentary [oil/gas] basins have been identified in Yemen…. 
[O]nly two … are well explored; the rest remain frontier 
basins” (As-Saruri & Sorkhabi, 2016). 
Indeed, there exists a gap between the officially acknowl-
edged resource base of the country and much higher unof-
ficial estimates. In fact, maritime zones of Yemen and the 
larger Red Sea area bordering Yemen’s western coastline 
are already known to contain rich oil and gas deposits. Ex-
ploration and drilling outside of Yemen’s Red Sea zone has 
already started involving Saudi, Norwegian, Chinese, and 
Canadian companies (Henni, 2017). Apart from access to 
mineral resources, principally oil, gas, and precious metals, 
the control of Yemen’s harbors, coastlines, and fishing areas 
is also very significant. However, foreign takeover of 
Yemen’s infrastructure and resources or an externally en-
forced new division of the country into northern and south-
ern zones of influence, or separate states, would funda-
mentally shift the regional balance of power. Thus, external 
intervention is bound to trigger new rounds of conflict. 
A CONFLICT MATRIX OF YEMEN 
In order to allow a well-rounded analysis of the Yemeni 
case since 1990, interests of actors at various levels, namely 
local, regional, and global must all be considered. For the 
purpose of the current article, the local actors are defined 
as Yemeni nationals, although they might also form alliance 
with external (foreign national and/or transnational) actors. 
This inevitably results in difficulty in explaining their ac-
tions in terms of purely local dynamics. Thus, the regional 
actors must also be assessed. These include the Arab states 
of the Middle East and the direct periphery of non-Arab 
states, Turkey, Israel, and Iran, flanking them (Hinnebusch, 
2015, p. 1). 
In terms of the global level, the three contemporary great 
powers, namely China, Russia, and the USA, will be ex-
amined. Among these three powers, the US influence is 
still dominant since most Arab states have entered long-
term patron-client relationships with US actors in economic 
and military spheres. Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) is 
another political and military actor in the region, but the 
country’s role has declined in comparison to the Cold War 
era with the notable exception of the Syrian case since 2015. 
Finally, China has recently emerged as a very significant 
economic actor in the Arab region. The country’s “Belt and 
Road Initiative” (BRI) places major emphasis on expanding 
economic interdependencies with Arab states and African 
countries located in the Horn of Africa in the immediate 
neighborhood of Yemen. Finally, some other OECD coun-
tries also play a secondary part in the region. Since their 
role is limited in comparison to the great powers, they are 
not focused on in the subsequent analysis. 
Rather than assuming any pre-existing hierarchy be-
tween the local, regional, and global analytical levels, a 
permanent fluctuation in their relative significance should 
be acknowledged. Moreover, different time frames, namely 
long-term, medium-term, and short-term, all influence the 
events in Yemen. When observing ongoing events, analysts 
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Table 1. Conflict Matrix of Yemen 
Local factors Regional factors Global factors 
Short-term 1 4 7 
Medium-term 2 5 8 
Long-term 3 6 9 
Explanation: For the purpose of comprehensive conflict analysis, each of the nine fields of the matrix must be considered. All nine fields are mutually interdependent and no preexist-
ing analytical hierarchy is implied. 
should therefore be aware of the structural background 
variables, namely long-term root causes of Yemen’s weak 
statehood that were already in place long before the start of 
the 2015 war (see Table 1). 
In conclusion, the conflict matrix presented here and uti-
lized in the next section allows for a dynamic interpreta-
tion of geopolitical conflict. Rather than simply assuming 
fixed strategies of the various actors, the matrix acknowl-
edges that individual “rational” action by state, sub-state, 
and non-state actors can produce the mutual blockage or 
even destruction of the parties involved. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: CAUSES OF YEMEN’S 
STATE FRAGILITY 
This section reviews some academic accounts of Yemen 
based on a longitudinal and multidisciplinary approach in 
order to trace major causes of Yemeni state fragility and 
subsequent collapse. The next three subsections look at lo-
cal, regional, and global influences that, taken together, 
allow a better understanding of the multiple overlapping 
causes of crisis in Yemen. The first subsection discusses lo-
cal factors, while the two subsequent subsections focus on 
regional and global factors. 
Local factors 
The four sources utilized here were published by an 
Egyptian public administration scholar, a British anthropol-
ogist, a North American political scientist, and a Czech-
born historian, respectively (Blumi, 2018; Day, 2012; 
Dresch, 2000; El-Azzazi, 1978). These accounts from dif-
ferent academic disciplines cover various time frames and 
complement each other. They also highlight some of the 
long-standing controversies in the scholarship on Yemen. 
To begin with El-Azzazi, his account focused solely on 
the former North Yemen (the YAR) outlining the then basic 
societal cleavages, namely the sect divisions between Za-
ydis, Shafi’is, and, thirdly, the much smaller group of Ish-
maelites. He stressed the key role of the two most influen-
tial Zaydi tribal confederations of Hashid and Bakil in the 
political power balance of North Yemen. El-Azzazi argued 
that an analytical focus on religious sect and tribal link-
ages was most appropriate: “[C]lassification according to 
religious communities and tribal belonging, not according 
to income levels, is put forward because tensions and con-
flicts within the political-administrative system become ap-
parent here. In this context, other possible stratifications, 
such as the control of the means of production or land own-
ership, are irrelevant because there exists hardly any in-
dustrial sector in Yemen and disparities in the agricultural 
sector appear to exercise no significant societal role” (El-
Azzazi, 1978, pp. 31–32).3 
From El-Azzazi’s perspective, the politics of North 
Yemen was mostly defined by conflicts between traditional 
tribal power structures and the “modern” state. The latter 
was being imposed by a group of Egyptian experts during 
the 1970s. However, this administrative experiment dis-
played a lack of concern for local realities. It only intro-
duced nominal structures of modern statehood such as 
ministries and public sector bureaucracies to North Yemen. 
However, the author’s field work suggested that employees 
of North Yemen’s recently founded ministries were unable 
to explain their own job responsibilities and had been re-
cruited based on their tribal or family links. In fact, role dis-
tribution within the “modern” state reflected pre-existing 
divisions of resources and power among traditional leader-
ship groups. These consisted primarily of Zaydi tribal elites, 
entrenched in the northern and central highlands, and of 
Shafi’i trading and commercial elites concentrated in the 
central midlands. 
Crucially, El-Azzazi suggested that no transfer of loyalty 
toward the state or growth of state capacity over time had 
yet occurred. In addition, the state’s capability to extract re-
sources from society, by taxation of the agricultural sector 
and of traders’ activities, remained very weak. Conversely, 
state authorities were compelled to distribute access to 
public employment, including the armed forces, in consul-
tation with the tribal authorities and had to offer “loyalty 
payments” to the powerful northern tribal leaders in order 
to avoid armed resistance. Thus, state authority remained 
limited and contested at all times. Finally, El-Azzazi sug-
gested that future state-building in North Yemen would 
have to focus on an ‘appropriate expansion of opportunities 
for political participation of the traditional groups [i.e. 
tribes] to weaken their autonomy and to decrease the ten-
sions within the existing [state] institutions’ (El-Azzazi, 
1978, p. 192). 
Another prominent author on Yemen was by contrast 
All German-language translations are by the author. 3 
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more hesitant to impose any “grand narrative” on the coun-
try’s history, suggesting that “[u]nifying forms of history 
work well for unifying institutions–ministries, states, stan-
dardized school systems–but Yemen works largely in other 
terms” (Dresch, 2000, p. xv). Dresch broadly agreed with El-
Azzazi’s view that tribal structures were a main explana-
tory factor defining social relations in North Yemen. Yet he 
stressed that this was not, or no longer, the case for some 
central and the southern regions (Dresch, 2000, p. 24). He 
also downplayed the cleavage between Zaydis and Shafi’is 
holding that “[t]he difference between ‘sects’ was seldom 
doctrine” (Dresch, 2000, pp. 15, 68). 
By contrast, Dresch stressed the shallow roots of the 
modern state and its concomitant “fiscal crisis,” namely 
public subsidies paid to tribal sheikhs for their loyalty were 
in the early 1970s considerably larger than the state’s agri-
cultural tax base. Thus, the material survival of state and 
society depended on external income, such as remittances 
of Yemenis working in neighboring Saudi Arabia and else-
where, and foreign funds granted to Yemeni elites in the 
context of development and state building projects (Dresch, 
2000, pp. 124, 134, 139). Dresch further suggested that ef-
forts at analyzing state and tribal authorities independently 
from each other were doomed to failure. In fact, “[t]he liter-
ature deals often in terms of state against tribe, in particu-
lar, as if these were separate entities and the advance of one 
geographically meant the other’s retreat” (Dresch, 2000, p. 
160). 
In the context of “security” being imposed by the state’s 
army on tribal areas, according to Dresch these operations 
could only take place because the tribal authorities con-
ducted them on their own terms, namely “the [army] men 
were all Hashidis [i.e. the militarily strongest tribal confed-
eration in North Yemen] and those in charge of them cho-
sen by the Shaykh, but they wore uniform” (Dresch, 2000, 
p. 160). To sum up, Dresch interpreted Yemen’s history as 
driven by the multitude of local actors: Yemeni leaders and 
their respective politico-economic projects fluctuate while 
society prevails for reasons that are beyond the reach of 
the “state”–about whose existence as a separate entity from 
other power structures we should in any case always remain 
skeptical.4 
In a more recent political science account, the politics of 
post-1990 unified Yemen was examined. According to Day, 
former President Saleh owed his long-term tenure as leader 
to his “Bonapartist style” in running Yemeni state struc-
tures. Saleh’s origin from the Sanhan tribe, a small subtribe 
of the Hashid tribal confederation, initially rendered him a 
rather weak political figure. However, he patiently expanded 
his power base using patron-client relations and the central 
state’s control of certain types of resources as a device to co-
opt or punish his political competitors (Day, 2012, Chapter 
3). As in other states of the Arab region, such neo-patrimo-
nial rule refers to the use of informal loyalties, originating 
in clan, tribe, family, regional and other pre-existing net-
works, in formal political institutions, such as political par-
ties, state and military bodies, or parliaments. 
Significantly, Saleh normally did not question underlying 
tribal and other traditional power structures as long as they 
served the purpose of expanding his personal patron-client 
network: “The state-tribal relationship in the northern YAR 
created an unstructured political system, which often ap-
peared chaotic whenever highland shaykhs acted coercively 
toward state leaders. But the relationship ultimately served 
the mutual interests of tribal and political elites from the high-
land region. (…) Throughout Salih’s rule of north Yemen, 
he governed with the mind-set of a tribesman, acting as a 
guardian of the old status quo where nontribal elites from 
midland and coastal regions must accommodate themselves 
to the highland tribes” (Day, 2012, pp. 97, 99, emphasis 
added). 
In a critical insight, Day further charges that the political 
scene after unification became too complex to maintain the 
earlier northern state-tribal network without triggering too 
much resistance elsewhere. Thus, the lengthy and bloody 
factionalism within unified Yemen and the step-by-step de-
cline of Saleh’s ability to control the situation due to splits 
amongst his former supporters, including northern tribal 
leaders, now demands a political and economic decentral-
ization of the country along federal lines (Day, 2012, pp. 
281–291). Day further argues that local government struc-
tures should be empowered and resource-rich regions, no-
tably the south, be allowed to gain more control over their 
resources, thereby “decentralizing decision-making powers 
outside the capital” (Day, 2012, pp. 105, 267–268, 298). The 
author declares that there is “little doubt that the success 
or failure of rebuilding Yemen’s government will depend 
on how the country’s complex regional dynamics are man-
aged, and how the issues of federalism and local govern-
ment power are handled” (Day, 2012, p. 301). 
It should be noted, however, that the concept of region-
alism as a solution to internal conflicts in Yemen has been 
attacked by other scholars as being overly reductionist to 
advance ongoing debates on how to stabilize Yemeni state-
hood (Elie, 2013). To begin with, scholars of Yemeni tribal-
ism have stressed that tribal structures provide many elab-
orate procedures for conflict resolution. They suggest that 
such structures have historically helped to de-escalate ten-
sions between different groups in Yemen, thereby avoiding 
the use of state coercion (Salmoni et al., 2010, pp. 53–64). 
The untested vision of federalism in Yemen, on the other 
hand, appeared to recent observers as part and parcel of 
a power grab by Hadi and other actors to deliver Yemeni 
wealth to outside interests. In particular, Hadi’s 2014 at-
tempt to introduce regionalism, namely the projected divi-
sion of Yemen into six extraordinarily unequal federal re-
gions concentrating most of the population in three 
northern federal districts and nearly all of the currently 
known natural resources in two southern federal districts, 
became in itself one major cause of his downfall in the sub-
A similar view has more recently been expressed in the context of anthropological research on the Houthi movement: “This epic conflict 
is too large to be read from a single perspective, on a single ‘plateau of analysis,’ whether sectarian, religious, economic, tribal or politi-
cal” (Brandt, 2017, p. 4). 
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sequent large-scale revolt against his rule. 
However, in order to appreciate why the solution to 
Yemen’s domestic problems cannot be found in clever do-
mestic constitutional engineering, such as regionalism, one 
must return to a more comprehensive analysis of the tran-
sition period from Saleh to Hadi. To begin with, any power-
ful executive figure within Yemen necessarily had to balance 
between domestic and international interests. This meant 
performing a dual role of satisfying domestic clients and 
striking deals with external actors. Saleh understood that 
his value as a middleman with the external interests de-
pended on delivering in both directions, namely “the key to 
long-term returns on investments to Yemen was stability” 
(Blumi, 2018, p. 182). Thus, Saleh had been always keen to 
develop close personal relationships to US presidents, such 
as Bush Sr. and Obama. He had allowed US corporations 
such as Hunt Oil, linked to the Bush family, to explore and 
extract Yemeni oil sources to strengthen his position with 
US decision-makers (Blumi, 2018, pp. 146–151). 
Yet the domestic coalition of interests that had enabled 
Saleh to act as an interlocutor with outside powers became 
eroded since the late 1990s. His earlier alliance with Ab-
dullah al-Ahmar, head of the Hashid tribal confederation 
whose Islamist al-Islah party nominally governed in a coali-
tion with Saleh’s GPC party, slowly collapsed. The cause of 
disagreements was economical, namely the al-Ahmar clan’s 
illegal selling of Yemeni oil via a London-based Norwegian 
firm called Arcadia (Blumi, 2018, p. 172). Following the 
death of al-Ahmar in 2007, Saleh turned against his earlier 
allies, now represented by a son of the deceased Shaykh. He 
also broke with General Ali Muhsen, a military figure that 
he had earlier, in 2004, ordered to fight the Houthi insur-
gency in the northern Saada province bordering Saudi Ara-
bia. Saleh started blaming his general for corruption in al-
liance with the al-Ahmars, as well as for the military failure 
to defeat the Houthis. Ali Muhsen therefore joined the 2011 
revolt against Saleh and at the moment of writing nomi-
nally still serves as Hadi’s deputy in Saudi exile. 
Crucially, “Saleh’s dutifully implementing IMF and 
World Bank readjustment programs” (Blumi, 2018, p. 183) 
also undermined his earlier popularity with Yemeni state 
employees. The majority of Yemeni citizens and especially 
young people and those living in rural areas suffered from 
reduced state subsidies and economic shocks. In particular, 
Yemen’s oil revenue was utilized to secure the political loy-
alty of regime followers, much of it ending up in foreign 
accounts, rather than invested in a productive manner. For 
the bulk of the population, the economic balance sheet of 
the 1990s and 2000s was that prizes rose, average incomes 
declined, and youth unemployment reached record levels. 
Moreover, the agricultural sector was neglected resulting in 
Yemen’s increasing dependency on food imports. The un-
regulated over-usage of water supplies for growing “qat,” a 
mild narcotic plant whose chewing releases a stimulant and 
is customary in Yemen, further contributed to chronic and 
increasingly severe water shortages (Varisco, 2019). Saleh’s 
last ditch efforts to draw in China, by offering various in-
vestment opportunities, came too late to allow him regain-
ing leverage over surrogates. An alternative reading might 
be that this move annoyed US observers sufficiently to fi-
nally drop him. 
However, Saleh’s forced withdrawal from the presidency 
and his replacement by Hadi in 2011 did not slow down but 
rather further speeded up efforts to privatize state assets. 
Most crucially, Hadi signed the protocol for Yemen’s acces-
sion to the WTO in December 2012. This included conces-
sions to “privatize eleven service sectors within a maximum 
of five years … expos[ing] Yemen’s companies to competi-
tion in the ‘free market,’ a move that promised tens of thou-
sands of layoffs” (Blumi, 2018, pp. 189–190). Since Hadi 
insisted on policies opposed by a majority of domestic polit-
ical actors, not least state employees, members of the mil-
itary, northern tribes, and the Houthi movement, he was 
compelled to fall back on support from his external spon-
sors, namely Saudi Arabia. Hadi also failed to offer domestic 
constituencies any credible vision of state-led development 
and provision of welfare policies (Dostal, 2010). Instead, he 
continued to run a predatory state along the lines of his pre-
decessor–except that the spoils were distributed even more 
narrowly. This proved to be the main cause for the failure of 
his regime to consolidate and prepared the Houthi’s subse-
quent takeover of most of North Yemen since 2014. 
Summing up this brief literature review of local conflict 
in Yemen, there appears consensus that northern tribal 
power structures and the impact of unification of the two 
Yemeni states in 1990 produced an ever more divided and 
fragmented polity in which access to new resources such as 
oil revenue produced multiple new claims on the state while 
further blurring lines of accountability. In addition, state 
structures had never, pre- or post-unification, consolidated 
in the sense of gaining autonomy from other forms and 
sources of political authority. These issues are discussed in 
the subsequent section, which examines the domestic polit-
ical cleavage structure in further detail. Beforehand, the re-
mainder of the current section turns to regional and global 
factors. 
Regional factors 
The Arab regional state system emerged after the col-
lapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 under primarily 
British influence. Thus, state units on the Arab peninsula 
mostly relate back to British indirect rule: pre-existing priv-
ileged relationships of the UK with certain clans (such as 
the al-Sauds) turned “protectorates” in a slow and unsteady 
process into state units. Instead of nation states, state 
building on the Arab peninsula produced “state nations” 
that continue to include various forms of traditional au-
thority, such as ruling families, and must still relate to ex-
ternal patrons to guarantee a degree of domestic stability. 
Following World War 2, the Arab regional system was es-
sentially taken over by the US starting with the agreement 
between US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and King 
Ibn Saud in 1944 to establish a strategic relationship. Dur-
ing the early Cold War, British influence collapsed. The So-
viet Union now emerged as the second major external power 
in the region and started backing a number of “radical” Arab 
regimes such as South Yemen after 1967. 
In the post-colonial Arab state system emerging after 
1945, two states made efforts to become regional hege-
mons, namely Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt in the 1950s 
and 1960s and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the 1980s. 
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Both efforts failed primarily due to external balancing by 
the US, which used its own power and a regional system of 
non-Arab close allies, namely Israel, Turkey and the Shah’s 
Iran (between 1953 and 1979) to back up its regional Arab 
clients, namely Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, against 
“radical” challengers. After the demise of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, most relevant states in the Middle East, other than 
Syria and Iraq, were already closely aligned with the US. 
The Arab states currently competing for influence in Yemen 
are all close US allies, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 
Qatar. Two other regional Arab states, Bahrain and Oman, 
are too weak to exercise much influence on the Yemeni sit-
uation. Finally, Turkey and Iran as non-Arab states are ge-
ographically further removed from Yemen and their role 
within the conflict is also more limited. In particular, there 
is no conclusive evidence of Iranian direct military support 
of the Houthis due to Iran’s logistical limitations, although 
ideational support is acknowledged and investigations 
about one small arms cache claimed to be linked to Iran are 
currently ongoing (United Nations Security Council, 2020, 
pp. 17, 25). 
In order to explain the three Arab states’ interventions 
in Yemen, one might first stress that they all held long-term 
track records of investing in Yemen economically and polit-
ically. Namely, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar each com-
peted in terms of investing in infrastructure such as har-
bors, mining, and real estate projects. In particular, it has 
been suggested that Saudi Arabia was pre-2015 most in-
terested in advancing a strategic “Bridge of the Horn [of 
Africa]” investment, namely to construct a bridge linking 
Yemen’s coastline with Djibouti (Blumi, 2018, pp. 174–175). 
To facilitate this project, access to the entire coastal low-
lands (Tihama) facing the Red Sea, which consists of the 
western shores of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, was required. 
The project would connect Saudi Arabia and Yemen on the 
Arab Peninsula with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and the pro-
ductive agricultural lands of Sudan. This would allow direct 
Saudi access to essential resources in the region. However, 
the Saudi bridge project would at the same time devalue 
pre-existing investments of the UAE in maritime transport 
and regional harbors in Djibouti and elsewhere in the re-
gion. 
In turn, the UAE was most interested in maintaining 
and expanding its share of control of regional trade routes 
and harbors. Therefore, the agreement between the UAE’s 
Dubai Ports World (DPW) and then Yemeni President Saleh 
in 2008 to expand the harbor of Aden and to initiate a Free 
Zone was the most important single UAE project within 
Yemen (Blumi, 2018, pp. 177–179). As soon as Hadi became 
president in 2012, however, the Aden and other UAE invest-
ments became scrutinized for “corruption.” The new gov-
ernment “initiated a ‘review’ of all deals made by the pre-
vious regime…. There was little doubt that the new bid 
would go to a Saudi or Qatari interest” (Blumi, 2018, p. 
191). Since Hadi’s regime was leaning toward Saudi inter-
ests and was domestically backed up by the al-Islah party, 
led by the al-Ahmar clan, and other Saudi-aligned northern 
tribal interests, the UAE started linking up with southern 
Yemeni interests to counterbalance the new political land-
scape. Soon the Southern Movement and southern tribes re-
ceived tacit UAE support in demands for regional autonomy 
or the restoration of South Yemen’s statehood. This policy 
shift was conducted in order to protect the previous UAE in-
vestments. At the same time, the UAE started to designate 
the al-Islah party as a terrorist organization. 
Finally, Qatar had also heavily invested in Yemeni poli-
tics and real estate under Saleh’s protection. In addition, it 
had linked up with northern tribes and the al-Islah party. 
This resulted in direct competition with Saudi parallel ef-
forts to control the al-Islah party and northern tribes. Over-
all, Qatar proved the weakest link among the three compet-
ing Arab powers and, post-Saleh presidency, lost its earlier 
influence in Yemen. In 2017, Qatar openly fell out with 
Saudi and UAE forces, especially the former, and some ob-
servers suggested that a new coalition consisting of Qatar, 
Turkey, and Iran was emerging to balance against Saudi and 
UAE forces in Yemen. Yet the actual degree of such alliance-
making, beyond the rhetorical level, remains in doubt since 
the potential partners might share certain interests in 
Yemen but strongly diverge on other issues. 
The most important analytical question is, however, 
whether any of the contemporary Arab states enjoys a de-
gree of autonomy to conduct a regional foreign policy in-
dependent from US patronage. In particular, the Gulf States 
and Saudi Arabia each host permanent US military installa-
tions. The only theoretically conceivable candidate for re-
gional Arab hegemon is Saudi Arabia on amount of its pop-
ulation size and economic significance as a major oil 
producer. But Saudi Arabia is an exceptionally poor candi-
date for regional hegemon due to the absence of strategic 
autonomy. The war in Yemen since 2015 has once again un-
derlined that the Saudi military is unable to conduct inde-
pendent operations in the absence of US military and logis-
tical support, British military trainers, Pakistani pilots, and 
“Saudi” ground troops hired from places other than Saudi 
Arabia (Lewis & Templar, 2018; Zeihan, 2020, p. 245). 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia also lacks meaningful economic 
autonomy from the western powers. Since the 1970s, the 
country’s oil revenue has principally been invested abroad 
in the advanced OECD economies. This translates into 
Saudi reluctance to push for higher degrees of Arab eco-
nomic autonomy: “The al-Saud’s came to see Western and 
Saudi interests as nearly indistinguishable: oil price rises 
that damaged the Western economy would damage Saudi 
investments, reduce demand for oil and stimulate oil explo-
ration in non-OPEC countries” (Hinnebusch, 2015, p. 52). 
Thus, it is in fact not possible to find any credible candi-
date country for regional Arab hegemon. Indeed, only the 
non-Arab regional neighbors–Israel, Turkey, and Iran–en-
joy economic and military capabilities that allow them var-
ious degrees of autonomy from the great powers to which 
attention now turns. 
Global factors 
The US primary role as external hegemon on the Arab 
peninsula and in the larger Middle East means that this 
country’s role differs fundamentally from those performed 
by the other two great powers China and Russia. Only the 
US engaged in the long-term penetration of the entire re-
gion since 1945, establishing a permanent military presence 
in nearly all regional states. The US Middle East strategy 
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was first announced in the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, de-
claring that the country would protect the regional “free na-
tions,” by military means if necessary, from “international 
communism.” The US posture as the Middle East’s main ex-
ternal balancer was restated in the 1980 Carter Doctrine, 
and the foundation of the United States Central Command 
(CENTCOM) in 1983 placed the US military focus even more 
firmly on the Middle East. 
After the demise of the Soviet Union, remaining external 
checks on US regional conduct were largely removed. In 
preparation for the First Gulf War in 1991, the US military 
erected new military installations in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf States. These military bases became permanent after 
the military defeat of the Iraqi forces and their withdrawal 
from Kuwait. Since then, the US succeeded in installing 
permanent military bases in nearly all Arab states. Only 
Lebanon is still free of an officially acknowledged US mil-
itary presence, while Syria and Yemen (in the former case 
the north-eastern oil fields and in the latter case the island 
of Socotra) have in recent years become at least temporary 
hosts for the US military. In the case of local clients, such 
US policies are based on the “oil for security” formula and 
include extensive US arms sales to regional partners. In par-
allel, the Arab allies frequently fund the US bases on their 
territories and US military activities in the region (Colgan, 
2013, Chapter 9). 
With regard to Yemen, US policies since the start of the 
“war on terror” in 2001 were principally aligned with the 
Saleh regime, which received limited but steady subsidies 
and military supplies in exchange for conducting operations 
against Al Qaida-affiliated groups in Yemen and for offi-
cially accepting US drone strikes within Yemen from US mil-
itary bases in Djibouti. Once the popular protests against 
Saleh took off in 2011, however, US policymakers withdrew 
from Saleh in order to back a Gulf Cooperation Council ini-
tiative, which suggested handing over the Yemeni presi-
dency to Hadi. This plan aligned US behavior with regional 
Saudi and UAE schemes (Perkins, 2017, p. 313). 
In recent years, China has emerged as the principal chal-
lenger of US hegemony. Because of its sustained high eco-
nomic growth rates since the 1980s, the country has devel-
oped into the industrial workshop of the world. While the 
US operate the largest military navy in the world to back up 
a system of US-led regional military alliances, China oper-
ates the largest merchant shipping fleet and is the world’s 
largest shipping manufacturer. Thus, China enters regional 
systems primarily by utilizing its economic strength. With 
the 2013 announcement of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” 
by the Chinese President Xi Jinping, subsequently renamed 
the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), the country offers eco-
nomic collaboration to developing and OECD countries fo-
cusing on infrastructure construction in exchange for 
China’s access to oil, minerals, and agricultural lands. China 
puts emphasis on the principle of economic collaboration 
for mutual advantage and offers long-term credit facilities 
for developing countries. The country stresses the principle 
of non-interference in domestic affairs of host countries, 
suggesting that political and military alliance building is 
not a principal concern of China (Pakistan is a significant 
exception from this pattern, however). 
In the Middle East and elsewhere, China has accepted the 
authority of existing governments treating them as busi-
ness partners, such as in building infrastructure in Africa 
and the Arab world in exchange for oil and gas deliveries re-
quired for China’s industrial economy. This has resulted in 
the rapid rise of economic interdependency between China 
and major Arab oil-exporting countries. Saudi Arabia is cur-
rently the largest oil supplier of China while other top 
sources include Oman and Iran. China has recently also be-
come the major investor in Iraq and is the second-most sig-
nificant trading partner of the UAE. China’s Merchant Hold-
ing International purchased a 23.5 percent share in the Port 
of Djibouti. In addition, the country has made major invest-
ments in the Horn of Africa region where it is constructing 
roads and harbors. In Yemen, China also engaged in the ex-
ploration of the country’s oil reserves before the 2015 war 
stopped further operations (Gresh, 2017). 
Overall, China has not visibly taken sides in domestic 
conflicts in the region. In the event of state collapse, such 
as in Libya and in Yemen since 2015, the country has cut 
its losses and has evacuated its nationals rather than to 
join in military conflict to protect its investments (Burton, 
2019). Significantly, it has been argued that Chinese infra-
structure investments aim to deepen mutual dependency. 
For example, China has further developed economic sectors 
previously largely abandoned by OECD countries such as 
nuclear energy. It has offered large-scale construction of 
nuclear power plants to Saudi Arabia. This country, in par-
ticular, would be rather unlikely to receive such technology 
from other suppliers due to proliferation concerns (Lin et 
al., 2020). 
Finally, the most significant single regional initiative of 
China is the expansion of Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s 
Baluchistan province. By expanding the port and building 
roads and railways from Gwadar to China’s north-western 
provinces, the country will gain an alternative land trans-
portation route between China and the Middle East region. 
This allows avoiding shipping routes across the Pacific 
Ocean and the Malaccan Straights, thereby gaining some 
autonomy from US naval dominance. Overall, China’s strat-
egy of economic collaboration with Arab states, Iran, and 
Israel (the latter serves as a source for military and ICT com-
ponents not directly available to China from the US) aims 
for national economic gains by avoiding the politicization 
of trade. 
Turning to the role of Russia in the region, the country 
has recently reemerged as a Middle Eastern power. This 
is largely due to its military intervention in Syria in 2015 
to protect the country’s government from losing power to 
Islamist insurgents. The Russian intervention occurred in 
reaction to earlier actions by Western states, namely the 
US, UK, France and some other EU states. These countries 
had previously sent special military forces to Syrian territo-
ries offering training and guidance to Syrian insurgents and 
Kurdish militias and supplying them with weapons. Sub-
sequently, US forces have also occupied most of Syria’s oil 
fields. 
By contrast, Russia and China are both concerned about 
the regional proliferation of Islamist terrorism. They con-
sider the presence of Russian and Chinese-national Islamist 
fighters in Syria as a potential threat to their own security. 
Russia’s intervention in Syria underlined the existence of 
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a long-term geopolitical alliance with the country’s leader-
ship that dates back to the 1950s (Dostal, 2018). It could 
also be interpreted as a response to former US President 
Obama’s statement suggesting that Russia was merely a 
“regional power.” By comparison, Russian policymakers 
have not shown any interest to directly intervene in the 
conflict in Yemen. Here, Russia’s response has been limited 
to hosting spokespeople of the former (pre-1990) Soviet-
aligned Southern Yemeni regime in high-profile Russian 
conference venues (Mohamed, 2018).5 Similar to China, 
Russia has focused less on Yemen and more on efforts to 
trade with major regional states such as Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf countries. 
FROM UNIFICATION TO STATE COLLAPSE: THE 
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN BETWEEN 1990 AND 2020 
This section summarizes the major developments during 
the three decades of the nominally unified but post-2015 
functionally collapsed Yemeni state. As already stated in 
the previous section, the primary purpose of the unification 
of the two Yemens, YAR and PDRY, was to facilitate the ex-
traction of oil and gas in the borderlands between the two 
states. It was hoped that the resource base of the unified 
country would allow further social and economic develop-
ment during the 1990s and into the 21st century. 
The main political developments after unification can be 
divided into six time periods, namely (1) from unification 
in 1990 to the outbreak of the 1994 civil war; (2) the period 
of consolidation of Saleh’s rule after the exclusion of most 
southern political actors, which restored northern political 
dominance (1994-2011); (3) the first transition period after 
the outbreak of mass protests against President Saleh, 
which resulted in his forced resignation from the presidency 
(2011-2012); (4) the second transition period of talks about 
future power sharing under the Hadi interim presidency 
(the “National Dialogue Conference” of 2013-2014); (5) the 
third transition period from the collapse of Hadi’s rule in 
2014 to the start of the Saudi air war on Yemen on 26 March 
2015; (6) finally, the breakup of the Yemeni state into at 
least three “statelets,” namely Houthi rule in most of the 
former north Yemen; rule of the Southern Movement in 
Aden and on the southern coastlines; and the presence of 
Hadi-aligned and Saudi-financed forces in Marib, one of the 
major centers of oil extraction in the center of the country, 
and in some other less-populated territories of the former 
south. 
As already mentioned, the unification process in 1990 
was initially based on the idea of equal power sharing be-
tween north and south. Saleh as the president of the former 
north retained the presidency of the unified country while 
the former southern YSP party leader Ali Salem al-Beidh 
became vice-president. The former head of the southern 
Supreme People’s Council and de facto president of the 
south, Haider al-Attas, was appointed as prime minister. 
Significantly, al-Beidh and al-Attas were survivors of the 
1986 factional armed clashes in the former south and had 
only served in PDRY leadership positions since then. Their 
respective networks of influence were much weaker in com-
parison to the ones controlled by Saleh. The capital of the 
former north, Sanaa, became the capital of the unified 
Yemen and all ministries were equally shared between 
northern and southern representatives. Finally, there was 
also some limited exchange of northern and southern army 
units who became stationed on opposite sides of the former 
border. 
Nevertheless, this nominal political partnership of 
equals did not work out in practical terms. Within the 
Sanaa-based northern bureaucracy, informal power struc-
tures heavily favored northern actors–no matter what kind 
of formal organizational hierarchy existed on paper. In ad-
dition, budgetary and fiscal discipline quickly started to de-
cline. The more corrupt northern economic actors took over 
economic management and abolished the former southern 
budgetary system that had followed strict accountability 
rules. Subsequently, progressive southern family legislation 
was abolished reintroducing polygamy in the south 
(Dahlgren, 2013, section 30-33). Ultimately, southern YSP 
politicians were intimidated and a campaign of political as-
sassinations began targeting them. Most observers agreed 
that northern tribal elements and Yemeni Islamists return-
ing from fighting in Afghanistan, in cooperation with 
northern security forces, were driving the violence in which 
more than 100 people were killed in 1992 (Day, 2012, pp. 
112–113). 
In 1993, the first relatively free and competitive parlia-
mentary elections in the history of Yemen took place. Three 
main parties, namely President Saleh’s GPC, the YSP, and 
the al-Islah (or “Yemeni Congregation for Reform”) Islamist 
party, founded in 1990 and led by Abdullah al-Ahmar, con-
tested the national vote. The electoral system was based on 
single member electoral districts and winner-takes-all prin-
ciples, which encouraged competition rather than coalition 
building. All three parties relied in their campaign efforts 
on pre-existing networks of patronage. In particular, the 
GPC of President Saleh overlapped with state institutions 
while the YSP had lost its former control of the southern 
bureaucracy since 1990 and was therefore in a weaker po-
sition. Thirdly, al-Islah, as another predominantly northern 
party and generously financed by Saudi Arabia, emerged as 
the decisive third force. 
Categorizing the politics of al-Islah has proven to be dif-
ficult for scholars. The party represents a form of Islamist 
outlier that brings together moderate Islamists, social con-
servatives, and radical Salafi elements (Milton-Edwards, 
2016, pp. 143–144). Briefly, al-Islah is a political movement 
in which nominally Zaydi elements that are in fact very 
close to Sunni doctrine coexist with Wahhabi extremist and 
more moderate Islamist currents. This eclectic coalition 
came about for a number of reasons. First, the founding of 
the new party helped to defend the role of the northern 
tribal element in the newly unified state. Second, “pragma-
tism” in terms of al-Islah’s ideological profile must be un-
As already mentioned, Ali Nasir Mohamed was the leader of the YSP faction that lost the 1986 power struggle in the PDRY. 5 
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derstood as part of Saudi efforts to gain a veto position in 
Yemeni politics while also maintaining close relations with 
Saleh and his supporters at the same time. 
The 1993 competitive parliamentary election returned 
123 seats for the GPC, 62 seats for al-Islah, and 56 seats 
for the YSP, respectively. This election result fairly closely 
mirrored the difference in population size prior to unifica-
tion (the former north had in 1990 a population of 7.5 mil-
lion citizens, roughly three times higher than the number 
of citizens in the former south). In 1993, pre-unification re-
gional cleavages essentially were still in place and al-Islah 
failed to gain any seats in the former south. The YSP man-
aged to gain 41 of the 56 contested southern seats, while 
the remainder was mostly taken by independent candidates 
rather than the GPC which finished with only three south-
ern seats. In turn, northern regions witnessed sometimes 
rather close two-way contests between the GPC and al-Islah 
(Day, 2012, p. 119). The inconclusive election result trig-
gered conflict between the three parties about how to pro-
ceed: northern and southern politicians could not agree on 
how to renew their earlier power-sharing agreement. Efforts 
at addressing this situation in a national dialogue com-
mittee produced a “Document of Pledge and Accord” that 
mostly focused on devolving political authority to the re-
gions. The Document was signed by Saleh, Vice-President 
al-Bid, and Shaykh al-Ahmar during a ceremony in Amman, 
Jordan, on February 20, 1994. 
However, the Document failed to solve any of the open 
questions with regard to power sharing. Instead, civil war 
broke out on April 27, 1994, when southern military units 
stationed in the north came under attack from northern 
forces in Sanaa and Dhamar. The subsequent brief war trig-
gered the announcement of secession on the part of the 
southern politicians, namely al-Bid declared himself to be 
the acting president of a “Democratic Republic of Yemen” 
before full-scale military defeat of southern forces on July 
21 ended this effort at secession. Subsequently, southern 
political leaders were compelled to flee the country while 
Saleh abandoned his earlier pretense of power sharing with 
YSP southerners and enforced direct northern economic 
control of southern oil and gas resources. 
In this process of political and economic restructuring, 
he once again relied on northern tribal networks, made par-
allel efforts to reorganize southern tribal networks under 
his personal patronage, and closed down southern branches 
of the civil service with a pre-unification track record. Ever 
since 1994, he governed in an unstable alliance with al-
Islah: all effective political power was now controlled by 
northern actors and especially by Saleh himself. In subse-
quent years, Saleh further strengthened his hold: the 1997 
parliamentary election was reduced to a contest between 
GPC and al-Islah delivering 187 seats for the former and 53 
to the latter while the YSP boycotted the election. Another 
round of parliamentary voting in 2003, the last one so far, 
delivered 226 seats for the GPC, 46 for al-Islah, and 7 for 
a re-organized YSP. There were also two presidential elec-
tions, in 1999 and 2006, in which Saleh was re-elected with 
96 and 77 per cent of the vote, respectively. All of the elec-
toral contests were organized in a manner that heavily fa-
vored Saleh at the expense of his competitors. 
When the “Arab Spring” occurred in Yemen in 2011, 
Saleh was initially challenged by a popular movement of 
students and civil society activists demanding democratic 
reforms and an opening of the system to the younger gen-
eration excluded from the existing cartel of power holders. 
As was the case in other Arab countries, the movement 
was quickly taken over by Islamist forces, especially al-Islah 
(Manea, 2015). Following an assassination attempt, Saleh 
was forced to leave Yemen for medical treatment in Saudi 
Arabia between June and September 2011. His long-stand-
ing Vice-President Hadi took over as acting president and 
was subsequently confirmed as chief executive in a tran-
sitional government that divided cabinet representation 
equally between Saleh’s GPC and al-Islah. Overcoming 
much resistance on the part of Saleh, Hadi was subse-
quently, on February 21, 2012, elected as the new Yemeni 
president in elections with him as the only candidate. Many 
observers expected this negotiated power transition to put 
Yemen’s statehood on a more stable track. This proved to be 
illusionary, however. 
On the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a “Na-
tional Dialogue Conference” of Yemeni political actors, in-
clusive of the Houthis and the Southern Movement, took 
place between March 2013 and January 2014. This event 
was supposed to deliver a new political settlement for the 
country. Foreign NGOs, in particular, hoped that encourag-
ing the participation of new independent actors would fa-
cilitate the creation of a broad-based political system. Such 
“transitology,” defined as “confidence in international ex-
perts’ ability to engineer transitions from authoritarian-
ism to stable liberal democracy,” was criticized by long-
standing observers of Yemeni affairs (Yadav & Carapico, 
2014). These efforts risked interfering with Yemeni realties, 
by backing weak actors against stronger ones. In fact, “tran-
sitology” ended up preparing new rounds of conflict, while 
celebrating what amounted to a “facade of inclusiveness 
that lent the conference legitimacy” (Transfeld, 2016, pp. 
155–159). Ultimately, the conference delivered an agree-
ment over power sharing that included only the existing 
power holders. The former President Saleh was allowed to 
retain his position as leader of the GPC and was granted im-
munity from prosecution–this also covered his position re-
garding his large personal wealth gained during his time in 
office. 
As for the new President Hadi, most journalistic ob-
servers simply stated that he had become “internationally 
recognized,” i.e. he was endorsed by the US, the UN-system, 
and Saudi Arabia. The fact that his presidency was always 
considered to be transitional in character–he was only ex-
pected to serve in order to facilitate the reorganization of 
Yemen’s political system after Saleh’s final departure from 
the presidency–and that the February 2012 election limited 
his tenure to a fixed transitional term of two years, from 
2012 to 2014, is ignored in such statements. To complicate 
matters further, Hadi severely lacks in leadership skills such 
as oratory ability, charisma and, most significantly, does 
not command any powerful political faction in Yemen other 
than the remnants of the post-1986 Ali Nassir group. One 
observer suggested that his political supporters “were con-
strained by the interests of other factions of their organi-
zations” only to conclude that “[he] was also weak in terms 
of tribal and military support, but enjoyed the backing of the 
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international community” (Transfeld, 2016, p. 155, emphasis 
added). 
Hadi’s effort at restructuring the Yemeni army, by re-
moving military leaders loyal to his predecessor and replac-
ing them with people deriving from Abyan province, the 
former regional stronghold of the Ali Nassir group, failed 
due to unclear lines of command within the armed forces 
and general resistance against his authority. One observer 
summed up that “plans remained plans and could not be 
implemented. (…) Although Hadi did his best to install his 
own loyalists in sensitive positions, his administration 
could not dismiss the many thousands of Sanhani officer 
[i.e. the sub-tribe of the Hashid tribal confederation to 
which Saleh belonged] with whom Saleh had staffed his 
armed forces for the previous three decades” (Barany, 2016, 
p. 31). 
One of the principal outcomes of the National Dialogue 
became the focus on regionalization, namely the country’s 
existing 22 administrative units were supposed to be reor-
ganized into six “regions” (four northern and two south-
ern). The latter suggestion was strongly opposed by the 
Houthis since the scheme would have left the northern 
highland region, cut down to a single region, without access 
to resources, the sea, and harbors. In addition, it also would 
have created a new enlarged southern “Hadramaut Region” 
covering more than half of the country’s territory and, most 
significantly, including 80 percent of the officially acknowl-
edged national oil reserves. Reacting to this regionalism 
plan, the official spokesperson for the Houthi movement, 
Mohamed Abdel Salam, stated that “[w]e did not sign this 
document and we consider it does not represent a solution, 
not to the issue of the South or to the unresolved national 
issues, and the division was in accordance to the political 
whim” (quoted on Al-Alam TV website, February 10, 2014, 
source no longer available). The overall outcome of the Dia-
logue Conference was to exclude the Houthis, the Southern 
Movement, and the youth protesters of 2011 from represen-
tation in government (Al-Eriani, 2020). 
In turn, Hadi made some efforts to counterbalance his 
exclusive reliance on the GPC and al-Islah by signing an-
other deal, on September 21, 2014, with representatives 
of the Houthis and the Southern Movement. This second 
deal, in fact not very different in style from his predecessor 
Saleh’s effort to double-cross other political forces, sug-
gested appointing Houthi and Southern Movement advisors 
to the Hadi Presidency, followed by the selection of a new 
prime minister expected to be a “neutral and impartial na-
tional figure of competence and high integrity (…) who shall 
enjoy broad political support” (Peace and National Partner-
ship Agreement, 2014). The agreement also included the 
commitment to appoint only non-party figures to key min-
istries, which questioned the strong previous position of 
GPC and al-Islah in a future government. Finally, the agree-
ment promised restoring fuel subsidization that had been 
cut in July 2014, which had triggered Houthi-led mass ral-
lies against the Hadi government. 
However, this second power-sharing formula, which the-
oretically would have provided for inclusive government, 
also broke down. The Houthis now advanced militarily on 
the capital city of Sanaa and the port city of Hodeida and 
took control of these two cities in September and October 
of 2014. At the same time, the Houthis and Saleh formed an 
informal alliance which delivered a majority of the Yemeni 
army, including the elite Republican Guards still loyal to 
Saleh, Saleh’s GPC party faction, and many northern tribal 
leaders, to the Houthi-led camp. On January 22, 2015, the 
Houthis and elements of the Yemeni military loyal to Saleh 
seized the presidential palace in Sanaa and pressured Hadi 
to declare his resignation from the presidency. By this time, 
the latter’s nominal two-year term in office had in any case 
already expired. 
Hadi subsequently escaped to Aden, where he withdrew 
his earlier resignation. This only triggered further military 
advances of the Houthis on Aden resulting in heavy fighting 
between March and July of 2015. Ultimately, the Houthi 
forces were pushed back from Aden after the insertion of 
new Saudi-backed ground troops. Hadi left Yemen for the 
Saudi capital Riad, arriving on March 26, 2015, and has 
resided in his host country ever since. On the same day, 
the Saudi air strikes against the combined Houthi and Saleh 
forces began. 
In parallel, the Southern Movement (since April 2017 
termed the Southern Transitional Council) declared aspira-
tions for full-scale independence of the south or, alterna-
tively, for a renegotiation of conditions with regard to the 
distribution of Yemeni state revenue in order to improve the 
economic and political position of the southern provinces 
(Alshaibi, 2017). On December 4, 2017, former president 
Saleh was assassinated by a Houthi sniper while he tried to 
flee from the city of Sanaa. It has been suggested that he 
had once again tried to double-cross the Houthis in trying 
to reconnect with Saudi Arabian political authorities (Ben-
said, 2018). 
As already previously stated, outside backing of Yemeni 
political and military actors is a major explanatory factor 
for events on the ground. In terms of regional Arab states, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar (until 2017), and, on a smaller 
scale, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Sudan all intervened on 
the side of the Hadi forces. Some of these states have sent 
their own troops and/or mercenaries into south Yemen to 
participate in fighting on the ground or have paid others to 
do so. In turn, the Houthis have intermittently fired rockets 
from north Yemen into Saudi Arabia. They argue that these 
attacks retaliate for the Saudi blockade of the Yemeni coast 
that they hold responsible for starving the Yemeni popu-
lation. Saudi media has acknowledged the incoming rocket 
fire, which also proves that the Houthis captured a large 
share of the former Yemeni army’s arsenal. 
Since the Saudi military had no previous experience in 
fighting ground wars, it relied on US military assistance 
and guidance. In turn, the Houthis were able to sustain 
their resistance partially due to the geographical features 
of Yemen’s northern highlands, which offer some protec-
tion against foreign invasions and aerial bombardments. In 
particular, the war against the Houthis is only notionally 
“Saudi-led” and could not continue without US target re-
connaissance and in-air refueling of Saudi jets (New York 
Times, 2018). Yet in spite of the vast technological superi-
ority and large-scale spending of resources on the part of 
Saudi Arabia, the war on Yemen has failed to produce any 
military decision in favor of Hadi or other pro-Saudi fac-
tions. 
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Summing up the current military situation, the Houthis 
and, in a secondary role, the Southern Transitional Council 
have gained influence and control over most of Yemen’s 
population centers. While Saudi Arabia is principally still 
interested in maintaining a unified Yemen under its tute-
lage, the UAE are in turn backing southern factions favoring 
southern autonomy or independence. This “war within a 
war” between the two “allies” concerns access to natural re-
sources in the less-populated southern regions of Yemen, 
such as oil, silver, and gold. Thus, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
might “triangulate” their backing of Hadi with support for 
various other Yemeni factions along tribal lines of loyalty, 
in the hope to have a strong say in future decision-making 
on southern resources. 
Last but not least, the US, France, and the UK have all 
signed new record arms deals with Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. Saudi Arabia is now the world’s largest arms importer 
and 73 percent of its military supplies derive from the US 
while the UAE is the third-largest US arms importer (Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute, 2020; Weze-
man, 2016). In turn, Yemen as the poorest state in the Arab 
world is paying the ultimate price by providing the battle-
space for the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE. In summary, it remains difficult to judge whether 
“controlled chaos,” due to external intervention, is most ad-
equately describing the Yemeni situation. Alternatively, the 
large-scale collapse of state and civil society institutions 
might simply point to “failed statehood” as a permanent 
outcome. 
The best conceivable outcome would of course be turning 
back to a dialogue-based negotiated settlement. However, 
this would imply withdrawal of external intervention as a 
precondition for peace in Yemen. Unfortunately, this is not 
very likely to happen any time soon. If it were to happen, 
in fact, the Houthis would certainly have to receive a large 
share of influence on the “state” (in inverted commas) due 
to their strong political and military position. By now, a ma-
jority of the northern tribal networks are also aligned with 
the Houthis. If no dialogue occurs, another potential sce-
nario might be the partial occupation of economically inter-
esting regions of Yemen by outside powers, although “sta-
bility” could never be restored under such scenario. 
CONCLUSION: YEMEN’S COLLAPSED 
STATEHOOD RECONSIDERED 
This section returns to the conflict matrix put forward 
above and asks why the conflict in Yemen prevails as a hurt-
ing stalemate and how global, regional, and local actors 
interact in the destruction of Yemen. To begin with the 
global actors, they are far away from the crisis zone and 
feel not threated by the situation in any existential manner. 
The previous two US administrations of Obama and Trump 
never expressed any major concern over the situation in 
Yemen. From their points of view, Yemen could be con-
trolled indirectly by dealing with the more important Arab 
clients, principally Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Under the 
Obama and Trump administrations, drone warfare in 
Yemen, peaking twice in 2012 and 2017, largely replaced ef-
forts to build political alliances with Yemeni actors. The es-
calating drone attacks also underlined the collapse of any 
US pretense of acknowledging nominal government author-
ity in Yemen. As far as Yemen’s potential significance as a 
source of natural resources is concerned, the current war 
closed down nearly all commercial activities of third coun-
tries, which is an acceptable outcome from the US perspec-
tive. 
In turn, China and Russia are also unwilling to directly 
engage with the conflict in Yemen. Similar to the US, both 
countries are primarily interested in economic openings 
with the economically and politically more significant re-
gional states. Since Saudi Arabia’s military failures in 
Yemen have highlighted the kingdom’s inability to act as 
a regional hegemon, these lessons might be considered re-
assuring for Chinese and Russian observers. Both countries 
wish to maintain existing economic and political relations 
with the Arab states and Iran. As long as Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE are occupied with the situation in Yemen, they are 
unlikely to confront Iran. After all, Iran remains an impor-
tant partner of Russia and China in terms of checking the 
US-led coalition of Arab states. 
As far as regional Arab powers are concerned, they are 
the main losers of the stalemate in Yemen. The efforts of 
the current Saudi leadership to acquire regional prestige, 
by backing Hadi’s Yemeni regime in exile, have only deliv-
ered humiliation. The UAE has fared relatively better since 
it picked a more viable Yemeni proxy, the Southern Move-
ment, and therefore purchased more influence on the 
ground (Brehony, 2020). Yet the fundamental problem in 
the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE is that 
both sides fear that the other side might gain the upper 
hand in Yemen. Therefore, they continue to hurt each other 
by supporting opposite Yemeni factions. 
In fact, the Houthi movement’s well-earned reputation 
as a formidable military opponent means that even a truly 
unified front of Saudis and UAE would be unlikely to pro-
duce any decisive outcome of the current war. On the one 
hand, Saudi Arabia’s leaders do not want to be seen to walk 
away from the catastrophe in Yemen as long as the Houthi’s 
rockets succeed in striking Saudi targets. On the other hand, 
the UAE could certainly live with an indecisive outcome of 
the current conflict, namely re-dividing Yemen once more 
into a northern and southern state–as long as the latter 
with its economic resources would be part of the UAE’s zone 
of influence. This outcome is in turn unacceptable from the 
Saudi point of view: it would hand over most of the econom-
ically interesting parts of Yemen to the main regional com-
petitor while still leaving the destabilized north for Saudi 
policymakers to deal with in an open-ended manner. 
This leaves finally the local Yemeni actors. To begin with, 
Yemeni statehood has always retained features of tradi-
tional rule based on pre-existing structures of authority 
deriving from clan, tribe, family, sect, region, and other 
factors. When left alone, the local Yemeni actors were nor-
mally able to effectively stop the uncontrolled escalation of 
domestic conflict. However, under conditions of globaliza-
tion and regionalization, the longstanding dysfunction of 
the larger Arab state system, combined with foreign states’ 
intervention in regional and local affairs, multiplied the 
challenges for Yemeni actors who have been increasingly 
tempted to appeal to outside forces for local back-up. In 
this context, domestic actors claim to represent “the state” 
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because they hope to strengthen their bargaining position 
in relation to external interests. Hadi still claims to rep-
resent the state, and so do the Houthis, and the Southern 
Movement. Yet attempting to save the state in places where 
it does not exist means that a phantom is being rescued 
(Jütersonke & Kartas, 2015). 
Back in 2012, Hadi appeared to be an ideal candidate for 
external support from the US, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 
the UN system as expressed in the UN-Security Council Res-
olution 2216 of April 14, 2015. Without previous fact-find-
ing, the UN resolution claimed that Hadi enjoyed “legit-
imacy” (Russia notably abstained from this particular UN 
vote). While Hadi’s predecessor Saleh had always retained 
a habit of searching for new political deals with external 
sponsors and was prepared to double-cross his patrons, in-
cluding the US, his successor was expected to be more re-
liable in following external advice. However, the events of 
subsequent years demonstrated that Hadi was in no posi-
tion to deliver a sufficient number of Yemeni factions to his 
external sponsors. 
Thus, Yemen’s domestic actors certainly cannot expect 
salvation from any individual leadership figure. Their best 
hope remains agreeing on power sharing within some in-
clusive national body. Failing to do so means that they will 
continue to face endless rounds of “external balancing” in 
which Yemeni factions are resupplied for another round of 
fighting (each round weakening all domestic actors in their 
bargaining position vis-à-vis external forces). Crucially, do-
mestic actors must acknowledge that the existing power re-
lations, inclusive of tribal structures, make up the politi-
cal reality of the country. Yemen’s state failure has forced 
citizens to fall back on entrenched traditional institutions 
and identities in order to organize their survival. There is 
no contradiction in the statement that most Yemeni people 
do not hold a tribal identity, a claim mostly accepted in the 
academic literature, and the parallel observation that trib-
alism has recently re-gained in significance due to the on-
going state collapse. 
The structural decline of the country in terms of its dra-
matic health crisis (the 2017 Cholera outbreak is due to the 
destruction of the sewage system in Saudi air strikes), and 
parallel ecological collapse (water shortages) suggests that 
any future polity would require a degree of domestic sta-
bility to utilize remaining local resources for development. 
In this context, re-dividing the country and returning to 
a pre-1990 two states situation is very likely not a viable 
option because it would create winners and losers, locally, 
regionally, and globally, in terms of access to natural re-
sources and political influence. It would issue in the next 
round of conflict and also offend against the long-standing 
regional and global norm to avoid redrawing state bound-
aries (Fazal, 2007, Chapter 7). 
If ignored any further, the humanitarian catastrophe in 
Yemen will certainly continue to escalate. Further regional 
and global acceleration, due to famine, refugee movements, 
and pandemics, must be expected. Until now, the underre-
porting of the humanitarian costs of Saudi and UAE warfare 
in Yemen is largely due to the disinterest of the great pow-
ers to assume any leading role in the crisis. In fact, China, 
Russia, and the US currently compete in other venues that 
are more critical for their respective future prospects. Fur-
ther rounds of politicized trade conflict between China and 
the US, in particular, could of course change the current 
pattern of regional interaction in the medium term. This 
would certainly affect China’s growing role in the regional 
oil trade vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and other Arab producer 
states. No matter what happens elsewhere in the region, 
however, the crisis in Yemen is not going to go away. To sum 
up Yemen’s predicament, the external actors have over-
reached, have tried picking winners in poorly understood 
domestic conflicts, and have destroyed much of the coun-
try–rather than putting forward an agenda based on the 
principle of peace through development. 
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